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Social and Financial Efficiency of Islamic Microfinance 
Institutions: A Data Envelopment Analysis Application 
Abstract 
Microfinance has been developed as alternative solution for global poverty alleviation effort 
in the last 30 years. Microfinance institution (MFI) has unique characteristic wherein they 
face double bottom line objectives of outreach to the poor and financial sustainability. This 
study proposes a two-stage analysis to measure Islamic Microfinance institutions (IMFIs) 
performance by comparing them to conventional MFIs. First, we develop a Data 
Envelopment Analysis (DEA) framework to measure MFIs’ efficiency in its double bottom 
line objectives, i.e. in terms of social and financial efficiency. In the second stage non-
parametric tests are used to compare the performance and identify factors that contribute to 
the efficiency of IMFIs and MFIs.  
Keywords: Data Envelopment Analysis, Islamic Microfinance, Microfinance Institutions, 
Efficiency, Performance Measurement 
1. Introduction 
Microfinance has been one of the solutions prescribed for global poverty alleviation over the 
past three decades (Koveos & Randhawa, 2004; Shaw, 2004). It has since achieved substantial 
attention and focus, particularly in achieving the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of 
halving global poverty in 2015 (Balkenhol, 2007). It addresses formal banking system failure 
in eradicating vicious circle of poverty (Chowdhury & Mukhopadhaya, 2012a; Conning, 
1999) by extending financing to the poor, or ‘the unbankable’ (Simanowitz & Walter, 2002) 
who are deemed too risky thus excluded by formal banking (Di Martino & Sarsour, 2012; 
Vanroose & D’Espallier, 2013). Furthermore, small loans that they demanded are considered 
unprofitable (Johnston & Morduch, 2008).  
Ironically, microfinance institutions (MFIs) charge high interest rates; mostly even much 
higher than banks owing to high costs incurred from relatively small loan (Ahmed, 2002; 
Diop et al., 2007; Obaidullah, 2008; Rahman, 1999), subjected them to criticism (Copestake, 
2007a). Moreover, MFIs face difficulty penetrating into regions with substantial Muslim 
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population observing religious prohibition of interest (The Louis Berger Group, 2010; UN-
HABITAT, 2005), creating unmet demands for financing among the poor therein (Segrado, 
2005). Thus, Islamic microfinance concept had been developed as alternative for Muslim 
borrowers; based on Islamic financial contracts (Karim et al., 2008).  
Nevertheless, the yardstick of microfinance success lies in its actual performance versus its 
raison d’être of poverty alleviation, i.e. ‘the extent to which it alleviates poverty levels of its 
existing and potential customers’ (Nanayakkara & Iselin, 2012, p. 173). Specifically, MFIs are 
different from traditional financial institutions due to existence of double bottom line 
objectives of outreach and financial sustainability (Tulchin, 2003), i.e. aiding the poorest out 
of poverty whilst striving to sustain operation for long term. Thus, both outreach and 
financial sustainability are MFIs’ objectives (Abdelkader et al., 2012; Hermes & Lensink, 
2011; Vanroose & D’Espallier, 2013) and likewise becoming standard on which their 
performance is judged (Yaron, 1994). 
Whilst IMFIs starting to play instrumental part in Muslim-populated regions in Asia, Africa, 
Central Europe and Middle East and North Africa (Karim et al., 2008; Obaidullah & Khan, 
2008; Parveen, 2009), there are very scant, if any, comprehensive empirical studies assessing 
their actual performance relative to dual objectives. Given its potential, comprehensive 
empirical study is dreadfully needed to assess IMFI performance vis-à-vis double bottom 
objectives and to compare them against conventional MFI counterparts; assessing its 
viability as alternative in poverty alleviation to gain wider support from governments and 
donors. 
This study thus proposes relative efficiency as a performance criterion that can be applied 
equally to measure overall, social and financial aspects of MFI performance (Balkenhol, 
2007). Specifically, this study proposes the use of Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), a non-
parametric linear programming-based efficiency analysis. It constructed a piece-wise 
frontier from all best-performing MFIs; thereafter individual MFI’s relative efficiency is 
calculated against MFI(s) with similar characteristics/attributes located in the frontier as its 
benchmark(s). From efficiency perspective, an MFI must strive for efficiency in its social and 
financial objectives. DEA enables different specifications to measure overall efficiency, social 
efficiency and financial efficiency (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2009). 
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This research seeks to contribute towards microfinance and Islamic microfinance studies, 
particularly in currently limited empirical studies in Islamic microfinance performance, as 
well as towards DEA literatures in application of DEA as an adept methodology in 
microfinance performance assessment. Finally, this study serves as reflection and wake-up 
call to IMFIs to improve future performance thus contributing towards the development of 
Islamic microfinance. 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows: next section provides general background on 
microfinance, i.e. conventional and Islamic MFIs concept differences, MFI operational 
objectives, and application of efficiency as performance measures. Section 3 explores 
conceptual framework for efficiency measurement and DEA, further described in section 4 
with DEA specifications used in this study. Dataset is laid out in section 5 and subsequently 
followed by first-stage and second-stage analysis in section 6 and 7, respectively. Results 
from these analyses are discussed in section 8 with direction for further research is proposed 
in section 9.  
2. Microfinance  
(a) Microfinance and Islamic Microfinance 
The main role of MFI is expanding economic opportunity and financial market to the poor 
(Copestake et al., 2002; Seibel & Agung, 2005; Seibel, 2008; Wright & Copestake, 2004), which 
is considered as effective solution in achieving poverty reduction and other socioeconomic 
benefits (Li et al., 2011). The underlying assumption being that among causes of poverty is 
lack of economic opportunities, which can be bridged by microfinance (Comim, 2007)  since 
it is regarded as capable method to assist in distribution of income support and in creation 
of income-generating activities (Diop et al., 2007).  
Yet, relatively small loan extended by MFIs incurred similar transaction costs with large 
loans, which increase further when MFIs target poor borrowers due to three factors: small 
amounts, location of poor borrowers and group-lending method to mitigate credit risks 
hence high fixed costs (Diop et al., 2007). High interest rates is thus charged to cover these 
transaction costs (Chahine & Tannir, 2010; Conning & Morduch, 2011; Takahashi et al., 2010; 
Visconti & Muzigiti, 2009) with justification that borrowers return is high in percentage 
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terms thus paying for high interest rates is not perceived as harmful for the borrowers (Ferro 
Luzzi & Weber, 2007; Obaidullah & Khan, 2008). 
Nevertheless, high interest rate is argued to be problematic. It is documented that high 
interest rates combined with over-indebtedness and loan misuse often eventually led to 
excesses ranging from borrowers caught in spiralling debt (Hashemi et al., 2007), resulted in 
poor borrowers selling whatever asset they have (Parveen, 2009) to the extreme cases of 
microfinance-linked suicides in Andhra Pradesh, India in 2010 (Conning & Morduch, 2011; 
van Rooyen et al., 2012) and in Sri Lanka (Obaidullah & Mohamed-Saleem, 2008). Adverse 
selection increases whereby customers borrow without intention to repay (Diop et al., 2007). 
Moreover, MFI operatives often found acting equivalent to loan shark in boosting 
repayment (Servin et al., 2012). This study concurs with Armendariz de Aghion and 
Morduch (2005) that poor borrowers will not be able to pay continuous high interest in long 
term.  
Islamic microfinance concept was later developed as alternative in regions with substantial 
Muslim population observing faith-based prohibition of interest. It aims to provide better 
model in addressing embedded issues of high interest rate and others in 
mainstream/conventional microfinance (Ahmed, 2002, 2007). Employing interest-free 
contracts, Islamic microfinance institution (IMFI) theoretically extends in-kind, in lieu of 
monetary, assistance to the poor thereby overcoming misuse and over-indebtedness 
(Ahmed, 2002; Obaidullah, 2008). Islamic microfinance broadens concept of microcredit-
cum-trainings by incorporating charity in financing, in the form of zakah (alms) and waqf 
(endowment), assisting the poorest in basic necessities and avoiding misuse of productive 
loans into consumption purposes (Ahmed, 2007; Wilson, 2007). Although relatively small in 
scale, Islamic microfinance has grown globally following the growth of wider Islamic 
finance industry (Karim et al., 2008).          
(b) Microfinance and double bottom line objectives 
Outreach and sustainability are dual objectives of MFI operation (Tulchin, 2003). Outreach is 
defined as social value of MFI output in six aspects, i.e. depth, breadth, length, scope, worth 
of users, and cost to users (Navajas et al.,  2000; Schreiner, 2002). These aspects are the 
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defined as the following: depth of outreach is defined as the extent to which MFI penetrate 
deeper to the poorest, breadth is measured by number of borrowers  assisted, length is the 
time frame of microfinance service is provided to a community, scope of outreach refers to 
number of services variety provided (e.g. loan, savings and others), worth of users is how 
much clients value the service provided based on how it matches clients’ needs, and cost to 
users is calculated by the total costs clients have to pay for the service as the sum of price 
costs (interest and fee) and transaction costs. Among these aspects, the focus on outreach in 
most studies is on the depth and breadth of outreach (Quayes, 2012). On the other hand, 
sustainability is defined as permanence or the MFI ability to sustain its microcredit and 
other operations as a viable financial institution (Cull et al., 2007; Navajas et al., 2000). This is 
equally important as MFI is expected to operate in long term to have profound impact on 
the poor (Balkenhol, 2007; Quayes, 2012). 
Morduch (1999) observed that MFIs’ sound financial performance does not guarantee depth 
of outreach, let alone poverty alleviation; whilst Navajas et al. (2000) examined that MFIs 
serve households that are either just below the poverty line – ‘the richest of the poor’ – or 
just above the poverty line – ‘the poorest of the rich’ – in its strive to be profitable. Schreiner 
(2002) concluded that the depth of outreach and financial sustainability are like conflicting 
objectives thus a trade-off exists: outreach is only attained by sacrificing financial 
sustainability or by relying more on donations or subsidies. He suggested MFIs to strive for 
breadth, scope and length aspects of outreach instead of depth. Studies by Hermes and 
Lensink (2011), von Pischke (1996), Mersland and Strøm (2008), Hermes et al. (2011) and 
others also focused on this trade-off. 
Cull et al. (2007) suggested that MFIs can sustain their profitability by not lending the 
poorest, given higher cost per dollar of loan, but to the ‘less poor’ instead as overall welfare 
will improve. Yet, this study argued along with Ahmed (2002), that microfinance is actually 
a response to the failure of trickle-down development policy to alleviate poverty in most 
developing countries, owing to asymmetric information. 
Simanowitz (2007) argued that MFI can and should manage this objectives trade-off. Paxton 
and Cuevas (2002) cited in Quayes (2012:3422) argued that, contrary to Diop et al. (2007), 
group loan schemes actually reduce costs in lending small loans hence trade-off is managed. 
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Stiglitz (1990) supported this view since similar structure of small loans minimises costs. 
Regarding breadth versus depth of outreach, Quayes (2012) argued that the rapid growth of 
microfinance in the past two decades has spurred the growth in number of borrowers both 
at the industry and at the firm level yet this does not necessarily means reaching out to the 
poorest, as also found by Navajas et al. (2000). Since helping the poorest is the raison d’être of 
microfinance, the depth of outreach, which is generally measured using proxy of average 
loan balance per borrower, can be regarded as measure for quality of outreach whilst 
breadth of outreach represents quantity in outreach (Quayes, 2012).  Thus, studies concerned 
with outreach to the poorest have focus on both; as in Armendariz and Szafarz (2011), 
Nanayakkara and Iselin (2012), and Simanowitz (2003). Furthermore, Haq et al. (2010), 
Fluckiger & Vassiliev (2007) and Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) among others, empirically 
observed that both outreach and financial sustainability can be pursued in best-practice 
MFIs.  
(c) Efficiency as a measure of MFI performance  
Traditional financial indicators are not sufficient to assess microfinance performance since, 
due to its social mission, sustainability in MFI is not necessarily limited to profitability but 
rather to MFI ability ‘to operate in long term without threat of bankruptcy’ (Nanayakkara, 
2012, p. 94). Thus, whilst some MFIs deliberately focus on profitability to reach sustainability 
(e.g. bank-MFI), there exist other MFIs where profitability is not a major focus and achieve 
sustainability by contribution from donors or external grant, e.g. non-governmental 
organisation-based MFI (NGO-MFI). Using traditional financial ratios to measure MFI 
performance can also be ambiguous: an MFI can excel in one ratio but fail in others hence 
difficulty in overall performance benchmarking (Bogetoft & Otto, 2011). Furthermore, 
separate ratios cannot measure how different inputs concurrently affect multiple outputs in 
transformation process (Thanassoulis, 2001). 
Due to this partiality problem, MFI stakeholders may face confusion in benchmarking 
overall performance of an MFI against other MFIs, which is essential to drive MFI 
performance improvement (Balkenhol, 2007). Fluckiger and Vassiliev (2007) added that 
aggregation problem occurs when all these indicators are to be combined into one 
assessment criterion. Likewise, basing performance to single indicator overlooks any 
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substitutions, interactions and trade-offs between several performance measures (Bogetoft & 
Otto, 2011; Zhu, 2003).  
Efficiency is thus proposed in this study as MFI performance measurement criterion due to 
its capability to cover both different aspects of microfinance and to be applied to both 
commercial and not-for-profit MFIs (Balkenhol, 2007). Efficiency relates usage of input to 
create output; traditionally defined as ratio of output over input, e.g. cost per unit, 
production per labour hour (Cooper et al., 2000). Yet, efficiency in microfinance studies is 
still in ratio form; though evolving from ‘operational efficiency’ in Micro-Banking Bulletin 
1997 into five ratios in Micro-Banking Bulletin 2006 (Balkenhol, 2007), hence partiality 
problem. 
Consequently, modern efficiency approach capable to be applied to multiple-inputs and 
multiple-outputs, to all types of MFIs, and to benchmark overall MFI performance is 
needed. One such method is Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA), described in the following 
sections.  
3. Conceptual Framework for Efficiency Measurement 
(a) Efficiency  
Efficiency in production theory refers to the utilisation of inputs into outputs. It concerns 
with optimal combination of inputs to produce maximum outputs or producing given 
outputs with least quantity of inputs hence minimising waste. Farrell (1957) widened this 
concept into relative efficiency, i.e. the extent to which actual observable use of resources by 
an organisation to produce a given quality of outputs matches optimal use of these resources 
(Bhagavath, 2006). Farrell (1957) classified the concept of efficiency into productive 
(technical) efficiency, price (allocative) efficiency, and economic (cost) efficiency. Technical 
efficiency deals with utilisation of inputs to produce outputs relative to best practice 
organisations with similar characteristics (Bhat et al., 2001; Emrouznejad & Anouze, 2010); 
measuring the extent of wasted resources from transformation process (Masiye et al., 2006). 
It is influenced by managerial practice and operational scale (Thanassoulis, 2001). Allocative 
efficiency calculates whether resources have been allocated to produce outputs with highest 
possible value, i.e. with lowest possible cost (Masiye et al.,  2006; Thanassoulis, 2001); 
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indicating the influence of input prices. Cost or economic efficiency is the combination of 
technical and allocative efficiency; measuring organisation’s ability to produce without 
waste and to allocate resources in their highly valued use (Coelli et al., 2005; Masiye et al., 
2006) whereby an organisation can only reach overall cost or economic efficiency if it is both 
technically and allocatively efficient (Thanassoulis, 2001). As the prices of inputs and 
outputs in microfinance context are not easily determined, e.g. number of borrowers or 
portfolio at risk, this study will solely focus on technical efficiency Besides these, scale 
efficiency calculates the impact of scale size by measuring an organisation’s technical 
efficiency at its current production scale relative to that at its most productive scale size 
(Coelli et al., 2005; Thanassoulis, 2001).  
Data Envelopment Analysis 
Developed by Charnes et al. (1978), Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) is a non-parametric 
method that expands single input-output productive efficiency concept from Farrell (1957) 
into efficiency assessment in transformation process of decision-making unit (DMU) with 
multiple-inputs and multiple-outputs. Using linear programming, it forms a ‘floating’ piece-
wise linear production frontier on top of all data as best-practice benchmark (or reference 
set) against which each DMU is assessed, hence the term ‘envelopment’ (Cook & Zhu, 2005; 
Emrouznejad & Anouze, 2010; Fluckiger & Vassiliev, 2007). Technical Efficiency is calculated 
as distance of DMU to reference set on the frontier; creating relative efficiency measure for 
all DMUs (Cook & Zhu, 2005; Cooper et al., 2004; Emrouznejad & Anouze, 2009). Since its 
beginning in 1978, there has been tremendous growth both in modelling and applications in 
DEA studies in various sectors (Emrouznejad et al., 2008). DEA excels in assessing 
efficiencies without a priori assumption on the distribution and production function (Cook & 
Zhu, 2005; Cooper et al., 2004) thus shines in situation where inputs-outputs relationship is 
not straightforward.  
Consequently, DEA is an appropriate method for MFI assessment whereby functional 
relationship between multiple inputs and outputs therein are often not directly observable. 
MFI effort to reach its double bottom line objectives can be perceived as efficiency problem, 
i.e. how an MFI transforms resources (inputs) to reach these dual objectives (outputs) 
compared to its best practice peers. As per Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009), MFI dual objectives 
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can be perceived as social efficiency and financial efficiency. Though still scant, DEA has 
thus far been used in several MFI studies.  
Two basic DEA models are CCR model of Charnes et al. (1978) and BCC model of Banker et 
al. (1984). CCR model assesses technical efficiency under Constant Return to Scale (CRS) 
condition hence CRS model. Multiple inputs and outputs for a given DMU are linearly 
aggregated into single ‘virtual’ input and output in the following manner:  
=
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= + + =
= + + =
= =
∑
∑
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∑
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 ...
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i i
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r r
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Whereby 	and  are weights for observed input 	and for observed output 	, 
respectively. Efficiency score is assigned for each DMU in a way that maximise the ratio of 
weighted output to weighted input. BCC model in Banker et al. (1984) modifies CCR model 
by applying a more realistic assumption of Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) wherein each 
DMU is allowed to exhibit different returns to scale due to different environment, hence 
VRS model. CRS is only valid if a DMU operates at its most productive scale size yet that is 
often not the case. Scale efficiency causes the difference between VRS technical efficiency of 
a given DMU, i.e. pure technical efficiency, to its CRS technical efficiency, i.e. global 
technical efficiency (Coelli et al., 2005; Thanassoulis, 2001). Two approaches in basic DEA 
models are input-orientated, i.e. maximises proportional inputs reduction whilst holding 
outputs constant, and output-orientated, which maximises the proportional outputs increase 
whilst keeping inputs constant, as in the following equation (1) and (2), respectively. 
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Banker et al. (1984) added   
!
 "#
= 1 in the constraint set to represent convexity constraint 
for	 	in VRS condition; ensuring a DMU to be compared only to similarly-sized DMUs with 
similar return to scale. Pure technical efficiency scores from BCC model is thereby greater or 
equal to global technical efficiency scores from CCR model as DMU is measured relative to 
smaller number of DMUs (Thanassoulis, 2001).  
4. Measuring MFIs Performance: Social and Financial efficiency  
Assessment framework 
There are different approaches to assess MFIs performance as financial institutions, i.e. 
production or intermediation approach (Athanassopoulos, 1997; Berger & Humphrey, 1997). 
Under production approach, financial institutions are regarded as production units using 
capital and labour as inputs to produce outputs of loans, deposits, and other financial 
services. Conversely, under intermediary approach, they are regarded as financial 
intermediaries using inputs of deposits from economic agents with fund surplus to produce 
outputs of loans and other financial services to economic agents in deficit (Athanassopoulos, 
1997; Kipesha, 2012). Thus, the role of deposit is different, i.e. as output in production 
approach but as input in the intermediary approach (Balkenhol, 2007; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 
2007). Since many IMFIs and their conventional MFIs in dataset are not collecting deposit 
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hence production approach is applied herein, as in many DEA microfinance studies (e.g. 
Fluckiger & Vassiliev, 2007; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2009; Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007; Haq et 
al., 2010; Hassan & Sanchez, 2009; Kipesha, 2012; Sedzro & Keita, 2009).  
This research applied both output-orientated and input-orientated CCR and BCC models in 
its DEA analyses. Output-orientated model is used because microfinance units naturally 
strive to maximise outputs (dual objectives) given limited available inputs. Nevertheless, 
input-orientated model is also applied herein so as to provide comparison in a condition 
where MFIs are unable to increase outputs due to geographical, demographical or 
regulatory restriction thus only face option of lowering inputs to increase efficiencies. As 
differences in operational size may affect efficiency, BCC model using VRS assumption is 
intuitively more befitting to measure MFIs performance. Nevertheless, CCR model is also 
observed to compare to efficiency at optimal scale and to calculate scale efficiency. 
Table 1: DEA Input variables 
 
DEA input-output selection 
Inputs Initial Definition Usage in literatures Unit
Assets A Total wealth available to MFI from capital 
and borrowings for its transformation 
process. It is used as inputs to represent 
capital for production approach.
Bassem (2008), Kipesha (2012) 
and Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2009)
USD '000
Operating 
Expense
O Expenses related to operations, e.g. all 
personnel expense, depreciation and 
amortization, and administrative expense. 
It is used as input in production approach 
since production process will not be viable 
in the long run if outputs were produced at 
high costs hence need to be managed to 
avoid waste.
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2007), 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009), 
Hassan and Sanchez (2009) and 
Athanassopoulos (1997)
USD '000
Portfolio at 
Rixk 30 days
R Percentage of total loan outstanding at risk 
of default by having one or more  principal 
or instalments in arrears more than 30 days. 
This variable is used herein as input in 
production approach to represent risk in 
transformation process as less risk is 
favourable for the firm. 
As far as we concerned, it has not 
been used as input in other DEA 
– microfinance literatures. 
%
Employee E Labour input, i.e. all individuals employed 
by MFI, including contract employees or 
advisor whether or not listed on MFI 
employee roster 
Athanassopoulos (1997), Bassem 
(2008), Hassan and Sanchez (2009), 
Sedzro and Keita (2009), Kipesha 
(2012), and Haq et al. (2010)
Numeric
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From literatures, DEA in this study utilises four inputs representing aspects of capital and 
labour in production and three outputs, i.e. two outputs representing outreach (social 
objective) and one output representing sustainability (financial objective), as presented in 
Table 1 and Table 2. Data thereof are obtained from MiX database1.  
Table 2: DEA Output variables 
 
It should be noted herewith from this input-output selection: (1) although as far as we are 
concerned it has never been used before in DEA-microfinance studies, we selected Portfolio 
at Risk 30 days as it is one of the most important indicators in microfinance literature as 
warning sign of future delinquency problem (Rosenberg, 2009). (2) Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. 
(2009) used standardized average loan balance in an index of the benefit to the poor in 
combination with borrowers, whilst we keep these separately as output to differentiate 
quality and quantity of outreach and to avoid problem associating with the use of index as 
DEA input/output (Emrouznejad & Amin, 2009). (3) We upholds using number of active 
borrowers as output due to IMFI emphasis on family borrowers as opposed to solely women 
                                                           
1
 Data in Microfinance Information Exchange (MiX) is collected from MFIs globally; adjusted and 
standardized thereafter to make it uniform and comparable. MiX also ranks its contributing MFIs’ 
transparency using scale of 1 to 5 diamonds for the least transparent to the most transparent. 
Outputs Initial Definition Usage in literatures Unit
MFI 
Objective 
(Efficiency) 
Represented
Financial 
Revenue
F Revenue from loan portfolio, including 
margin rate charged in Islamic microfinance 
loan. It is used as output in production 
approach and proxy for sustainability  since 
an MFI that cannot collect enough revenue 
will not be viable to operate in the long run 
by itself
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) and 
Hassan & Sanchez (2009).
USD '000 Sustainability                 
(Financial 
Efficiency)
Inverse of 
Average 
Loan 
Borrower
I Inverse format of average loan balance per 
MFI borrowers, which is a widely used 
proxy to measure depth of  outreach ; 
standardized over gross national income 
(GNI) per capita to remove currency & 
purchasing power parity difference. Usage of 
inverse format so as to have characteristic as 
output wherre larger value means better.
Modification from literatures. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) use 
average loan borrower as index 
with number of borrower whilst 
we use them separately.
% Outreach                        
(Social 
Efficiency)
Borrowers B the number of individual or entity who 
currently has outstanding loan balance with 
MFIs or is primarily responsible for 
repaying any portion of the Gross Loan 
Portfolio. Herein, it is used an output to 
resemble the breadth of outreach .  
Modification from literatures. 
Most literatures use number of 
women borrowers, e.g. Cull et al. 
(2007) and Nghiem et al. (2006). 
Numeric Sustainability                 
(Financial 
Efficiency)
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borrowers (Ahmed, 2002); thereby male head of the household and women partner will 
collectively be loan agreement signatories, putting thereunto repayment responsibility and 
discouraging loan misuse by male partner.  
DEA model specifications  
In DEA assessment for overall efficiency as well as social and financial efficiency in isolation, 
in common with (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2009), as in Table 3 three different specifications are 
utilised: 
Table 3: DEA Model Specifications 
 
 
5. Data  
This study utilises data from MiX database for 231 MFIs in three regions: Middle East and 
North Africa (MENA), East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) and South Asia (SA), in which most 
IMFIs in MiX mainly operates. Whilst most MFIs in dataset are independent firms operating 
in their countries/regions, some are local branch of global NGOs or banks, e.g. BRAC and 
FINCA, or microfinance arm of local banks, e.g. Khushhali Bank in Pakistan. MFIs herein are 
classified into three schemes: conventional/mainstream, Islamic, and Islamic windows. 
Islamic window MFIs are MFIs offering both conventional and Islamic microloans. In this 
research, Islamic and window MFIs are grouped together with IMFIs as they are located in 
 DEA 
specifications
Efficiency 
represented 
Inputs variables Outputs variables
•   Assets (A) •   Financial revenue (F)
•   Operating expenses (O)
•   Portfolio at risk 30 days (R)
•   Employees (E) •   Number of borrowers (B)
•   Assets (A) •   Financial revenue (F)
•   Operating Expenses (O)
•   Portfolio at risk 30 days (R)
•   Employees (E)
•   Assets (A)
•   Operating expenses (O)
•   Portfolio at risk 30 days (R) •   Number of borrowers (B)
•   Employees (E)
   •   Average loan balance per Borrower 
over GNI per capita (in Inverse form) – (I)
AORE-FIB
Overall 
efficiency
   •   Average loan balance per Borrower 
over GNI per capita (in Inverse form) – (I)
AORE-F
Financial 
efficiency
AORE-IB
Social 
efficiency
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MENA region where Islamic microloan is their major product albeit offering conventional 
microloans. Table 4 presents summary of MFI groupings in study. 
Table 4: Summary of MFI and classification in study 
 
All monetary data in dataset are in US Dollars hence comparable. Due to missing data, only 
balanced data of 2009–2010 is used and statistical summary of data is reported in Table 5.  
Table 5: Descriptive statistics of input and output factors, for 231 MFIs & IMFIs 
 
Mean normalization as per Sarkis (2007) is used to standardized the data to avoid “scaling” 
issues in calculation as magnitude differences between some inputs and outputs are very 
wide.   
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where ()	is value of ith input of DMU0, N is the total number of DMU in sample, and 
(*+,-. 	is the mean-normalized value of ith input of DMU0. 
Spearman’s Rho correlation in Table 6 shows that significantly strong correlations exists 
between asset, operational expenses, and employee within inputs, and between financial 
Conven
tional Islamic
Islamic 
Window
Young 
MFIs
Mature 
MFIs
Not-For-
Profit 
MFI
For-
Profit 
MFI
Small 
Scale 
MFI
Medium 
Scale 
MFI
Large 
Scale 
MFI
Low End Broad High End Small Business Unregulated Regulated 
East Asia 
and the 
Pacific
63 1 0 10 53 28 35 13 26 24 32 28 1 2 25 38
Middle East 
and North 
Africa
29 9 13 22 29 48 3 13 17 21 32 18 0 1 27 24
South Asia 113 4 0 39 78 69 48 25 37 55 97 18 2 0 31 86
MFI Classification
Scheme Age Profit Orientation MFI TransformationTarget MarketLoan Portfolio Scale
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revenue and borrowers within outputs. These correlations are expected due to inputs and 
outputs used in this study, i.e. number of employee will have high correlation with 
operating expenses in inputs and number of borrower may have high correlation with 
financial revenue collected as outputs. Nevertheless, they are retained in the DEA 
specification as they are important inputs and outputs in MFI efficiency assessment. These 
do not necessarily imply causal relationship; DEA algorithm will assign weights to these 
and maximise them according to their weights. On the contrary, in the presence of high 
correlations, the use of parametric efficiency measurement method may not be appropriate 
due to multi-co-linearity problem which makes beta coefficients for correlated independent 
variables unreliable. The presence of multiple outputs also makes the application of DEA 
more appropriate in this study. 
Table 6: Spearman’s Rho Correlations within Inputs and within Outputs
 
 
6. First stage analysis: A DEA approach 
Efficiency in 2009 and 2010 for each IMFI is assessed against all MFIs in global frontier, 
against MFIs in its own regional frontiers and against all IMFIs in Islamic frontier. Analysis 
herein focuses on VRS output-orientated global frontier results, complemented with result 
highlights from CRS model, regional frontiers, and Islamic frontier. Thereafter, efficiency 
scores are plotted into XY scatterplot with social efficiency at X axis and financial efficiency 
at Y axis to observe MFI positioning regarding these objectives. The XY scatterplot area is 
divided into four quadrants counter-clockwise: from quadrant I in top right for high social – 
high financial efficiency quadrant area until quadrant IV in bottom right for high social 
efficiency – low financial efficiency area.  
A O R E F I B
1.000 .898* .019 .841* 1.000 -.046 .812*
.000 .682 .000 .319 .000
.898* 1.000 .053 .846** -.046 1.000 .266*
.000 .257 .000 .319 .000
.019 .053 1.000 .053 .812* .266* 1.000
.682 .257 .258 .000 .000
.841** .846** .053 1.000
.000 .000 .258
F
I
B
* = Correlation is significant at the 99% confidence interval 
(2-tailed).
A
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E
Spearman's Rho Correlations - Within Inputs Spearman's Rho Correlations - Within Outputs
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Based on its theoretical model and mission, it is presumed that Islamic/window MFIs to 
have higher social efficiency than conventional MFIs whilst more established conventional 
MFIs to have higher financial efficiency. No presumption is established upon overall 
efficiency due to it being a mixture of said dual objectives.  
Output-oriented DEA Analysis for global frontier 
Overall efficiency (AORE-FIB specification): As seen in Table 7, facing 2009 global frontier, 
Islamic/window MFIs show lower mean of VRS overall efficiency (pure overall efficiency) 
than conventional MFIs by 75.32% versus 78.24%; a wake-up call for Islamic microfinance 
proponents. Scale efficiency of MFIs is higher than that of Islamic/window MFIs, i.e. 93.60% 
versus 92.02%, indicating that conventional MFIs on average were slightly closer to most 
productive scale size. Thus, these lead to higher mean CRS overall efficiency (global overall 
efficiency) of conventional MFIs, i.e. 73.02% against 69.10%.  
Against 2010 global frontier, Islamic/window MFIs show higher mean VRS overall efficiency 
than conventional MFIs of 82.48% versus 79.31%, yet slightly lower mean CRS overall 
efficiency of  75.1% to 75.34%  due to lower mean of scale efficiency of 91.29% against 
95.03%. High mean scale efficiency in both schemes indicate that, on average, source of 
inefficiency for MFIs vis-à-vis overall objective in 2009 and 2010 is technical inefficiency, not 
operational scale. However, lower scale efficiency of Islamic/window MFIs hurt their 
performance in comparison to conventional MFIs in CRS condition. 
First quartile VRS score of Islamic/window MFIs is also lower than conventional MFIs 
relative to 2009 global frontier, i.e. 51.41% and 65.58%, respectively; though higher at 67.84% 
to 66.79%, respectively relative to 2010 global frontier. Generally, IMFIs performance 
compared to MFIs vis-à-vis overall objective raises an alarm for its proponents. 
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 Table 7: Islamic/windows vs Conventional MFIs 2009-10 - VRS global frontier 
 
Financial efficiency (AORE-F specification): Consistent to expectation, against 2009 meta-
frontier, Islamic/window MFIs have lower mean VRS financial efficiency than conventional 
MFIs, i.e. 65.11% to 71.28%. Furthermore, Islamic/window MFIs also have lower mean CRS 
financial efficiency than IMFIs, i.e. 56.26% versus 66.53%, respectively, indicating its general 
farther distance to optimal scale. Against 2010 global frontier, however, Islamic/windows 
MFIs marginally outperform conventional MFIs in financial efficiency, i.e. 73.47% to 72.94% 
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but underperform to MFIs in CRS condition of 61.70 to 67.56%. Conventional MFIs again 
have higher mean scale efficiency of 93.18% versus 86.76% relative to 2010 global frontier.  
In summary, whilst source of financial inefficiency for all MFIs and IMFIs is also technical 
inefficiency, this is an issue for Islamic/window MFIs that suffer from lower scale efficiency 
vis-à-vis financial objective compared to conventional MFIs, hurting their CRS efficiency. 
Social Efficiency (AORE-IB Specification): Surprisingly, conventional MFIs outperform 
IMFIs on mean VRS social efficiency relative to 2009 global frontier, i.e. 54.37% against 
44.71%, also marginally higher mean scale efficiency of 81.43% to 80.30%. Moreover, 66.70% 
of IMFIs scored below 50.00% versus 45.60% of conventional MFIs and lowest VRS score 
among IMFIs and conventional MFIs are 2.42% and 3.16%, respectively. Against 2010 global 
frontier, conventional MFIs on average outperform Islamic MFIs with higher mean VRS 
social efficiency (57.03% to 48.04%) and higher mean scale efficiency (88.85% to 84.18%), 
albeit lowest social efficiency score among conventional MFIs is 3.00% compared to 3.24% 
among Islamic/window MFIs. 
These results challenge initial expectation that Islamic/window MFIs, to overcome excesses 
from high interest rates, will outperform conventional MFIs in social efficiency. Lower mean 
and median VRS social efficiency of Islamic/window MFIs show that their poorer 
performance are attributable to higher technical inefficiency than conventional MFIs. 
Additionally, lower mean and median of Islamic/window MFIs’ CRS social efficiency 
demonstrate that lower operational scale compared to conventional MFIs further hurt IMFIs’ 
relative performance.  
Social efficiency versus financial efficiency mapping: In Figure 1, 14 out of 27 IMFIs are 
plotted in quadrant II relative to frontier in 2009 indicating their strategy are leaning toward 
financial efficiency. Yet, 7 IMFIs are plotted in quadrant I, where 2 IMFIs are fully-efficient 
in both objectives thus relative balance of dual objectives is feasible. Against 2010 frontier, 
MFIs spread more evenly in quadrant I and quadrant II. Ten IMFIs are in quadrant I with 3 
IMFIs fully-efficient in both objectives.  
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It should be noted, however, 4 IMFIs and 3 IMFIS are mapped in quadrant III relative to 
2009 and 2010 frontiers, respectively due to their low social- and financial efficiency scores. 
Amongst these, 2 IMFIs are mapped therein relative to both 2009 and 2010 frontiers - Reef 
Palestine (DMU 99) with its very low social efficiency scores and Al Amal Bank Yemen 
(DMU 230) with very low financial efficiency score. Thus, further investigation thus needed 
on their strategy.  
Figure 1: Social and financial efficiency 2009-10: VRS global frontier 
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On the contrary, the biggest IMFI in Pakistan, Akhuwat (DMU 231) are mapped in Quadrant 
IV in both 2009 and 2010 frontiers; it has high social efficiency scores – even fully efficient 
relative to 2010 frontiers – but scores very low on financial efficiency. This is because they do 
not charge any interest or margin to their borrowers; borrowers only repay the amount they 
borrow without any addition – via Islamic contract called Qardh Hasan. Akhuwat cover their 
entire operation from voluntary donations (Obaidullah & Khan, 2008). 
Results from regional and Islamic frontiers 
We found the following results from three regional frontiers and Islamic frontier: 
East Asia and the Pacific (EAP) frontier: On average, EAP MFIs perform impressively in 
mean VRS overall efficiency and VRS financial efficiency. Main source of inefficiency for 
both overall and financial efficiency is generally technical inefficiency in both frontiers. The 
only IMFI in EAP, AIM Malaysia is fully efficient in both overall and financial efficiency 
relative to both frontiers and fully scale-efficient in financial efficiency. This confirms the 
reputation of Malaysia as being the centre of effective Islamic banking and finance, with the 
best infrastructure in this sector.  
However, social efficiency of EAP MFIs on average are mediocre in both frontiers, with 
mean VRS social efficiency of 57.18% (2009 frontier) and 53.06% (2010 frontier). Since mean 
social scale efficiency are above 90% in both frontiers, the source of this mediocre 
performance was generally technical inefficiency; thus penetration strategy needs to be 
evaluated. AIM Malaysia’s social efficiency is above average with 70.76% (2009 frontier) and 
67.62% (2010 frontier) albeit mediocre scale efficiency of 64.75% and 67.55%, indicating both 
technical inefficiency and operational scale problems hereto. 
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) regional frontier: Relative to 2009 MENA regional 
frontier, conventional MFIs have higher mean and median of overall efficiency albeit 
Islamic/window MFIs having marginally higher overall scale efficiency. Against 2010 
frontier, Islamic/window MFIs slightly outperformed conventional MFIs in this measure. 
Consistent with presumption, conventional MFIs generally outperform Islamic/windows 
MFI in financial efficiency and in financial scale efficiency in 2009 frontier; yet 
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Islamic/windows topped them in 2010 frontier with marginally higher mean financial 
efficiency and mean scale efficiency. A plausible reason suggested thereto was 2010 
Moroccan microfinance crisis weakening average of all conventional MFIs, not IMFIs 
superior performance.  
Conversely, conventional MFIs defy initial presumption by outperforming Islamic MFIs in 
mean and media of social efficiency in both frontiers albeit higher mean social scale 
efficiency of Islamic/windows MFIs. This, and lower mean and median of overall and 
financial efficiency, indicate a serious wake-up call for IMFIs in the region that need serious 
attention thus call for further research.   
Generally, technical inefficiency is the major source of inefficiency for overall, financial, and 
social efficiency for all MFIs, particularly for Islamic MFIs in social efficiency. High mean 
scale efficiencies indicate that MENA MFIs generally operates closer to optimal scale.  
South Asia (SA) regional frontier: Four SA IMFIs in dataset outperformed SA conventional 
MFIs relative to both frontiers in mean overall efficiency and overall scale efficiency, also by 
wide margin in mean social efficiency and mean social scale efficiency. Though consistent 
with initial expectation for social efficiency, these are indeed surprising given longer 
operation of conventional MFIs.  
On the contrary, consistent with presumption, conventional SA MFIs outperform SA IMFIs 
in mean financial efficiency and mean financial scale efficiency in both frontiers. Wide 
margin differences of IMFIs scale efficiency from conventional MFIs in both frontiers 
indicate that Islamic MFIs are relatively farther to optimum scale hence scale problem for 
IMFIs; show by very low mean CRS financial efficiency of 28.92% to that of 73.32% from 
conventional MFIs.  
Islamic frontier: Relative to own frontiers in both 2009 and 2010, Islamic/windows MFIs 
generally deliver satisfactory performance in overall, financial, and social efficiency. 
Majority of IMFIs are located in quadrant I of XY plot map. In both frontiers, mean overall 
efficiency and mean overall scale efficiency are above 85%, mean financial efficiency and 
mean financial scale efficiency are above 75%, plus mean social efficiency and mean social 
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scale efficiency are above 77%; implying technical inefficiency as general source of 
inefficiency.  
Exception thereto being Al Amal Bank Yemen (DMU 230), where scale inefficiency hurt its 
CRS overall efficiency scores in 2009 for almost 40%. Farz Foundation (DMU 214) also 
suffers massive financial scale inefficiency. It is fully financial-efficient in both frontiers, yet 
due to its very small scale efficiency, its CRS financial efficiency scores are only 13.72% (2009 
frontier) and 12.33% (2010 frontier). Scale inefficiency also impairs social efficiency 
performance of Al Mosanid (DMU 74) and TDMN (DMU 79). TDMN was fully-efficient 
relative to both frontiers under VRS but only scores 36.06% (2009 frontier) and 51.49% (2010 
frontier) under CRS, implying very low scale efficiency. Al Mosanid was fully social-efficient 
relative to 2010 frontier but its low scale efficiency leads to CRS social efficiency score of 
57.45%. These may due to unstable political situation in their operation or perception 
problem regarding product compliance to religious law that barring them from increasing 
operational scale. Regardless, these deserve further investigation and attention.  
7. Second stage analysis: Non-parametric Post DEA Analysis  
The main objective of post DEA analysis herein is testing statistical significance of 
performance differences observed in mean efficiency scores from DEA analysis, i.e. whether 
different scheme of IMFIs and MFIs significantly affect differences in MFI efficiency in the 
dataset for 2009-2010. Moreover, we intend to observe several factors which may affect MFI 
efficiency, i.e. MFI age, operational region (in global frontier), MFI profit orientation, MFI 
scale of operation, MFI customer targeting and MFI regulation. Non-parametric tests are 
utilised as post DEA analysis instead of regression analysis due to only two-year period 
covered herein. 
Kruskal-Wallis H-test is used to analyse significant influence of aforementioned factors to 
MFIs performance differences. Since Kruskal-Wallis can only test statistical significance of 
differences not the direction of these differences, Jonckheere-Terpstra test is thereafter 
utilised as post hoc test in analysing whether a trend/pattern existed in median efficiency 
scores differences. Effect size estimate of this trend, r, is also calculated as per Rosenthal 
(1991:19) with magnitude of r is observed using benchmark in Cohen (1988). Jonckheere-
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Terpstra test is more meaningful in analysing pattern existence as it uses one-tailed test to 
observe effects from factors arranged in ranked order, e.g. MFIs are arranged into two 
ranked scheme groups to observe trend thereto: group 1 of MFIs with stricter scheme 
(Islamic/windows MFIs) and group 2 of MFIs with more flexible scheme (conventional 
MFIs), thereby a pattern can be observed from stricter to more flexible MFI scheme. 
Since 2009 and 2010 efficiency scores are calculated relative to different frontier, these are 
not directly comparable. Thus, to make these comparable, efficiency of all MFIs is 
recalculated using DEA against combined 2009 and 2010 meta-frontier in global, regional, 
and Islamic frontiers. All MFIs data are therefore combined into 462 DMUs in global frontier 
assessment, thereby making MFI efficiency scores equally comparable to each other relative 
to single meta-frontier. Likewise, this method is performed to regional MFIs and Islamic 
MFIs. However, post DEA analysis on influence of MFI region of operation to efficiency is 
only done on global frontier as limited EAP and SA IMFI barred this in Islamic meta-
frontier. Analysis herein focuses on global frontier with results from other frontiers 
highlighted thereafter. Post DEA results for global frontier is shown at Table 82. 
Post DEA analysis I: MFI efficiency vs MFI schemes - global frontier 
Post DEA analysis herein observes whether MFI schemes affect MFI efficiency scores. 
Kruskal-Wallis test is used in testing the statistical significance of median differences 
between Islamic/window – conventional MFIs and post hoc Jonckheere-Terpstra trend test is 
used to analyse whether trend exist in this differences by arranging MFIs in two groups as 
mentioned heretofore. As previously, the initial presumption is that Islamic/windows MFIs 
to have significant edge over conventional in social efficiency whilst conventional MFIs 
significantly prevail in financial efficiency. The findings are as follow: 
• Higher social efficiency of conventional MFIs in VRS and CRS assumptions are found to 
be statistically significant in meta-frontier approach yet with small effect size of 0.126 
(VRS) and 0.122 (CRS); consistent with first phase DEA results but contrasting with 
initial presumption. Yet, this is only confirmed in CRS input-orientated model. 
                                                           
2
 Post DEA results for global frontier from input-orientated model is presented at Appendix 2 as 
comparison. 
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• Consistent to expectation, higher financial efficiency of conventional MFIs are significant 
under VRS (85% confidence level) and CRS (99% confidence level) albeit small effect size 
of 0.059 (VRS) and 0.127 (CRS). In input-orientated model, only CRS is significant. 
• Islamic/windows MFIs lead in financial efficiency in first phase DEA results relative to 
2010 frontier is not found to be significant under meta-frontier approach.  
• Pertaining to overall efficiency, conventional MFIs lead over Islamic/window MFIs is 
only found to be significant under CRS assumption (input- and output-orientated) with 
very small effect sizes of 0.070.  
• Conventional MFIs are found to have significant higher mean scale efficiency with small 
effect on output-orientated (0.1333) and marginally medium effect on input-orientated 
(0.276); indicating closer proximity to most productive scale as per expectation. 
• In social efficiency, conventional MFIs have significant higher mean scale efficiency (99% 
confidence level) in input-orientated model with small size of 0.174. Conversely, 
Islamic/window MFIs are found to have significant higher mean scale efficiency in 
output-orientated model under meta frontier approach but only on 85% confidence level 
and with negligible effect size of 0.070. 
Post DEA analysis II: MFI efficiency vs MFI region of operation - global frontier 
Herewith, regions in observation are arranged in three ranked order according to adoption 
of microfinance therein from pioneer to late adopter: starting with South Asia, EAP, and 
finally MENA. Assessment is only performed for global frontier due to aforementioned 
reason. Initial presumption is that early adopter region to microfinance will have higher 
financial and social efficiency due to learning curve. The findings are as follow: 
• Operational region significantly affect MFI VRS and CRS financial efficiency in both 
models, where late adopter have higher financial efficiency: MENA followed by EAP 
then SA, defying initial presumption albeit with small effect sizes (r = 0.12 – 0.18).  
• Result above related to technical inefficiency regarding financial objective in early 
adopter regions because mean financial scale efficiency is actually higher in early adopter 
region in both models as expected, although with very small effect size of 0.05 – 0.07.  
• Operational region also influence VRS and CRS social efficiency significantly consistent 
with initial presumption in both models: SA have higher social efficiency, followed by 
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EAP, then MENA. Effect sizes ranging from medium to medium large (0.34 – 0.47) 
showing advantage as microfinance pioneer region in outreach.  
• On overall efficiency, no significant differences of MFI regions on overall efficiency from 
Kruskal-Wallis test or significant trend from Jonckheere-Terpstra test are found for both 
models. However, input-orientated model shows trend that regions adopting 
microfinance earlier have significant higher overall scale efficiency.  
Post DEA analysis III: MFI efficiency vs MFI age – global frontier 
We reclassified MFI age groups in MiX dataset, i.e. new (1-4 years), young (5-8 years), and 
mature (8 years plus) into two groups, i.e. group 1 of young MFIs (1-8 years) and group 2 of 
mature MFIs (above 8 years) due to small number of “new” MFIs. We expect that experience 
matters – older MFIs to have higher efficiency due to learning curve.  
We found that only VRS social efficiency in input-orientated model differs significantly due 
to MFI age, i.e. young MFIs exhibit higher efficiency scores compared to mature MFIs with 
very small effect size of 0.064. This result is in contrary to expectation; it may due to the fact 
that young MFIs are more idealistic and aggressive in its outreach to the poor. Regarding 
scale efficiency, young MFIs reveal significant higher scale in overall, financial, and social 
efficiency in output-orientation model, i.e. defying expectation albeit small effect size 
ranging from 0.085 – 0.097.  
Post DEA analysis IV: MFI efficiency vs MFI profit orientation – global frontier 
Empirical studies suggested that the Non-Governmental Organisations (NGO)-MFIs to be 
more efficient (Gutiérrez-Nieto et al., 2007; Haq et al., 2010), especially in social efficiency 
(Chowdhury & Mukhopadhaya, 2012b). Thus, based on existing literatures, presumption in 
this study was that not-for-profit MFIs in the dataset to have higher social efficiency and for-
profit MFIs to have higher financial efficiency. MFIs are thus ranked as two groups based on 
their profit motive, moving from not-for-profit to for-profit MFIs.  
Similar significant differences due to MFI profit-orientation are found in both models 
whereby not-for-profit MFIs display higher VRS and CRS overall and social efficiency; with 
small effect sizes for overall efficiency at 0.147 – 0.165 and small to medium for social 
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efficiency at 0.234 – 0.24. These results concur with abovementioned studies and 
presumption regarding social efficiency yet cannot confirm presumption on financial 
efficiency. 
Table 8: Summary Post DEA Analysis: Global Meta-frontier Output-orientated VRS 
 
Post DEA analysis V: MFI efficiency vs MFI loan portfolio – global frontier 
Differences in MFI efficiency due to different MFI loan portfolio/scale is assessed herewith 
by categorising MFIs in dataset into three groups based on gross loan portfolio, i.e. from 
small scale (less than 2 Million USD), medium scale (2 – 8 Million USD), and large scale 
(larger than 8 Million USD). The objective is to observe whether MFIs that has managed to 
grow its portfolio, i.e. termed as “scaling-up”, still perform well in terms of social efficiency 
or shift its focus toward  financial efficiency, i.e. existence of “mission drift” (Copestake, 
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2007a; Mersland & Strøm, 2010). Presumptions herein are MFIs with large portfolio excel in 
financial efficiency yet MFIs with small portfolio shine in social efficiency. We found that: 
• MFI loan scale significantly affects VRS and CRS overall and financial efficiency in both 
models: as MFI loan portfolio becomes larger its overall and financial efficiency tend to 
be higher. The effect size, r, for overall efficiency is from very small in input-orientated 
(0.065) to small in output-orientated (0.114). Regarding financial efficiency, the effect size 
is ranging from small in input-orientated (0.16) to marginally medium (0.269) in output-
orientated, thus confirms the presumption.  
• We observed significant differences in social efficiency due to loan size based on 
Kruskal-Wallis test in all models and all assumptions. However, the direction trend was 
only found in VRS input-orientated, i.e. the smaller loan portfolio of an MFI, the higher 
its social efficiency albeit small effect size (0.11). Thus, if plausible strategy to boost 
outreach for MFIs is only by reducing inputs, MFIs with smaller loan portfolio can 
perform more efficiently.  
Post DEA analysis VI: MFI efficiency vs MFI target customer – global frontier 
This section tests MFI efficiency differences due to different customer targeting based on 
average loan balance per borrower as percentage of GNI per capita. MFIs are classified into 
four ranked groups as per customer target in MiX, i.e. low end (maximum 20% of GNI per 
capita), broad (between 20% - 149% of GNI per capita), high end (between 150% - 250% of 
GNI per capita), and small business (over 250% of GNI per capita). Thus, trend/pattern 
existence moving from MFIs targeting on poorest borrowers to those targeting better-off 
poor can be assessed. Initial presumptions were that social efficiency will be lower but 
financial efficiency will be higher moving along from MFIs targeting poorest customer to 
those targeting well-off poor.  
Results show that VRS and CRS overall and social efficiency in both models are lower as 
MFIs shifting its target toward well-off poor. Effect size, r, is large for social efficiency (r = 
0.504 – 0.684) indicating that shifting target toward better-off customer significantly hurt 
social efficiency, consistent with expectation. MFIs targeting poorer borrowers are found to 
have significant higher overall efficiency with small to medium effect size (r = 0.23 – 0.30).  
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Regarding financial efficiency, significant differences in VRS MFI financial due to MFI client 
targeting is found in output-orientated model yet ranked trend cannot be established. 
Nevertheless, MFIs targeting poorer clients are found to have significant higher CRS 
financial efficiency though with very small effects of 0.068.  
Post DEA analysis VII: MFI efficiency vs MFI regulation – global frontier 
Many studies focus on the effect of regulating MFI to performance as there has recently been 
increasing pressure to regulate MFIs in developing countries (Hartarska & Nadolnyak, 2007; 
Tchakoute-Tchuigoua, 2010). Lafourcade et al. (2005) argued that regulated MFIs have 
higher efficiency whilst Hartarska & Nadolnyak (2007) observed globally that regulating 
MFIs does not necessarily warrant better outreach and sustainability, besides deposit-taking 
authorization. Instead, Haq et al., (2010) asserted that NGO-MFIs, mostly unregulated, are 
the most efficient under production approach. Therefore, influence of MFI regulation on 
efficiency is analysed herewith by ranking MFIs in two groups: unregulated and regulated 
MFIs. Based on literatures, initial presumption is that unregulated MFIs excel in social 
efficiency due to flexibility whilst regulated MFIs lead in financial efficiency due to deposit-
taking authorization. 
MFI regulation is found to significantly affect VRS and CRS overall, financial, and social 
efficiency in both models: efficiency scores are lower should MFIs become regulated albeit 
small effect size (r = 0.10 – 0.16). These findings confirm presumption in social efficiency but 
challenge that in financial efficiency. These confirm Hartarska & Nadolnyak (2007) for MFIs 
in dataset that regulating MFIs do not guarantee higher performance.  
Post DEA analysis results from regional and Islamic frontier 
Post DEA analysis is also conducted on three regional frontiers and Islamic frontiers. 
MFI efficiency vs MFI scheme: (1) Conventional MFIs in MENA meta-frontier exhibit 
higher VRS overall, financial, and social efficiency plus CRS financial efficiency scores in 
output-orientated model albeit with small effect size of 0.11 – 0.20; contrasting presumption 
on social efficiency yet concurring that on financial efficiency. (2) In line with presumption, 
in both models Islamic MFIs in SA meta-frontier have higher VRS and CRS social efficiency 
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
29 
 
(very small effects of 0.07 – 0.09) whilst SA conventional MFIs display higher VRS and CRS 
financial efficiency (small to medium effect size of 0.12 – 0.27).  
MFI efficiency vs MFI age: (1) Significant differences due to MFI age is found on VRS 
overall, financial and social efficiency  in EAP meta-frontier for all models whereby younger 
MFIs tend to have higher efficiency with small to medium effect size. (2) In MENA meta-
frontier, significant MFI age influences are found whereby mature MFIs tend to have higher 
VRS and CRS overall and social efficiency in output-orientated and CRS financial and social 
efficiency in input-orientated model, confirming presumption. (3) Young MFIs are 
significantly found to have tendency of higher VRS and CRS financial efficiency for both 
models in SA meta-frontier; conflicting presumption. (4) Significant findings in Islamic 
frontier that mature MFIs tend to have higher VRS and CRS social efficiency in output-
orientated whilst young MFIs tend to have higher VRS financial efficiency in input-
orientated.  
MFI efficiency vs MFI profit orientation: (1) Similar significant impact and trend exist in 
EAP, MENA, SA, and Islamic meta-frontiers for all models whereby not-for-profit MFIs 
display higher social efficiency as presumed; effect size is large in EAP meta-frontier (r = 0.48 
– 0.61), small to medium in Islamic meta-frontier (r = 0.26 – 0.31) yet small in others. (2) Not-
for-profit MFIs exhibit significant higher overall efficiency in all models and all condition  
with medium effect size (r = 0.21 – 0.41). (3) Not-for-profit MFIs display higher financial 
efficiency in EAP, MENA, and Islamic meta-frontier (small effect size in EAP but medium in 
the rest) yet mature MFIs reveal high financial efficiency in SA meta-frontier with small 
effect size.  
MFI efficiency vs MFI loan portfolio: (1) Significant differences in overall efficiency due to 
MFI loan portfolio are observed in all meta-frontiers for all models. However, linear trends 
can only be established in VRS overall efficiency in EAP meta-frontiers and in CRS overall 
efficiency in SA meta-frontiers albeit differently; MFIs with smaller loan portfolio exhibit 
higher scores (small effect size of 0.11 – 0.14) in the former but MFIs with larger loan 
portfolio display higher scores in the latter (r = 0.083). (2) MFI loan scale also significantly 
affects financial efficiency for all models in all meta-frontiers, yet patterns are only found in 
three frontiers: in EAP meta-frontier MFIs with smaller loan portfolio exhibit higher CRS 
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efficiency for input-orientated model contrasting prediction, whilst in MENA and SA meta-
frontiers MFIs with larger loan portfolio have higher VRS and CRS scores in both models as 
expected. (3) Concurring with presumption, MFIs with smaller loan portfolio tend to have 
higher VRS and CRS social efficiency in EAP and MENA meta-frontiers. 
MFI efficiency vs MFI target market: MFI target market is found to significantly influence 
overall, financial, and social efficiencies in all meta-frontiers for both models apart from CRS 
financial efficiency in Islamic meta-frontiers. Yet, significant linear patterns are only 
observed in the following: (1) VRS and CRS overall efficiency lowered when MFIs shift 
toward better-off poor in EAP, SA, and Islamic meta-frontiers in all models, with generally 
small to medium effect size except for Islamic meta-frontier where the effect size is medium 
(r = 0.28 – 0.34). (2) In MENA meta-frontier, same linear pattern can be established for VRS 
and CRS output-orientated and CRS input-orientated albeit small effect size (r = 0.12). (3) 
Contradicting presumption, MFIs shifting toward better-off poor exhibits lower VRS and 
CRS financial efficiency in SA meta-frontier (small effect size, r = 0.10 – 0.11) in both model, 
and  lower financial efficiency in EAP meta-frontier under VRS (output-orientated) and CRS 
(both models) though with small effect size. (4) MFIs targeting poorest clients have higher 
VRS and CRS social efficiency in EAP, MENA, SA, and Islamic meta-frontiers, with mostly 
large effect size (r = 0.49 – 0.60) except for VRS input-orientated model in MENA and Islamic 
meta-frontiers where the effect sizes are medium.  
MFI efficiency vs MFI regulation: (1) Unregulated MFIs have significantly higher VRS and 
CRS overall efficiency in EAP, MENA, and Islamic meta-frontiers despite small to medium 
effect size (r = 0.22 – 0.38) and higher VRS overall efficiency in SA meta-frontier with small 
effect size of 0.11. (2) Unregulated MFIs exhibits higher VRS and CRS financial efficiency for 
all models in MENA (small to medium effect size) and Islamic meta-frontiers (medium effect 
size). (3) Unregulated MFIs also have higher VRS financial efficiency for both models in SA 
meta-frontier and VRS input-orientated financial efficiency in EAP meta-frontier, though 
with small effect size. These results confirm presumption on social efficiency and defy that 
of financial efficiency. 
8. Discussions  
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Our analyses in this study confirm that: 
1) Although many MFIs in database have strategy focusing toward outreach (social 
efficiency) or financial sustainability (financial efficiency) as can be seen in the social-
financial efficiency mapping, there exist MFIs that managed to relatively pursue these 
objectives simultaneously. Thus, instead of focusing on trade-off between these 
objectives, the focus should be on pursuing them simultaneously by emulating MFIs 
with similar characteristics that have managed to do so, which is assigned by DEA 
model as peer benchmark for each MFIs.  
2) Islamic/window MFIs in dataset deliver comparable performance with conventional 
MFIs regarding VRS overall efficiency in global and SA meta-frontiers for both input- 
and output-orientated models, and in MENA meta-frontier for input-orientated model; 
yet, due to scale inefficiency, conventional MFIs outperform Islamic/window MFIs in 
term of CRS overall efficiency in global meta-frontier.  
3) Nevertheless, Islamic/window MFIs still generally cannot match conventional MFIs in 
financial efficiency in VRS and CRS financial efficiency in global, MENA, and SA meta-
frontiers in both models, except for VRS input-orientated model in global and MENA 
regional where they can display comparable performance with conventional MFIs.  
4) a) Moreover, Islamic/window MFIs in dataset still generally cannot match conventional 
MFIs’ social efficiency performance relative to global and MENA meta-frontiers 
under output-orientated model, contrasting with presumption. Islamic/window MFIs 
indeed outperform conventional MFIs in social efficiency for SA meta-frontier for 
both DEA models as per initial presumption yet the effect size is almost negligible, 
i.e. 0.07 – 0.09, whilst conventional MFIs surpassed them in global and MENA meta-
frontiers with relatively bigger effect size (r = 0.12 in global frontier and r = 0.11 – 0.20 
in MENA frontier).  
b) Islamic/window MFIs can only match conventional MFIs performance in MENA 
meta-frontier under input-orientated model, i.e. if the feasible strategy for MFIs is to 
minimise inputs to boost efficiency. This is indeed a wake-up call for proponents of 
IMFIs to rectify this matter since (1) improving conventional MFIs in outreach to the 
poorest by eliminating high interest rates is raison d’être of Islamic microfinance; (2) 
most Islamic/window MFIs are located in MENA region, whilst there are only four 
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Islamic/window MFIs in SA region so the results from MENA region can be seen as 
more closer to reality; (3) Naturally, most likely strategy undertaken by microfinance 
units is output-orientated, i.e. maximising outputs in the face of scarce resources. 
This indeed warrants further research.   
5) The major source of inefficiency observed for both conventional and Islamic/windows 
MFIs in 2009 – 2010 is generally technical inefficiency. Thus, MFIs are encouraged to re-
evaluate their strategy concerning dual objectives by emulating best practice MFIs’ 
assigned by DEA as their benchmark to increase efficiency. 
6) Significant regional effect to MFI efficiency relative to global frontier is observed as 
follow: MFIs in region with earlier microfinance adoption generally have found suitable 
scale and strategy to penetrate deeper into poorest borrowers hence higher mean social 
efficiency. MFIs in region with relatively nascent microfinance operation may still have 
learning curve in increasing their penetration. Otherwise, these may show different 
customer targeting as per Diop et al. (2007), i.e. MFIs targeting entrepreneurial poor (or 
well-off poor) instead of absolute poor in region with relatively newer microfinance 
operation may have caused opposite trend in financial efficiency. This needs further 
qualitative investigation. 
7) a) We found that in global meta-frontier MFI age does not have significant effect over 
VRS and CRS overall and financial efficiency in both models and also VRS social 
efficiency in output-orientated. Young MFIs are indeed found to have significantly 
higher VRS social efficiency in input-orientated model, albeit negligible effect size at 
0.064. Thus, in general we confirm Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) that MFI age does not 
affect efficiency in global frontier.  
b) Nevertheless, results are different in regional scope:  in EAP meta-frontier, young 
MFIs exhibit higher VRS overall, financial, and social efficiency scores whilst in SA 
meta-frontiers they display higher financial efficiency, which challenges initial 
presumption that positive relationship exists between MFI efficiency and age. This 
may due to aggressive fresh strategy of young MFIs in expanding operation thus 
confirming Nghiem et al. (2006) that young MFIs tend to have higher efficiency in 
EAP region.  
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c)  On the contrary, mature MFIs have higher VRS and CRS overall and social efficiency 
(output-orientated) and CRS financial and social efficiency (input-orientated) in 
MENA meta-frontier, indicating that attaining efficiency therein generally takes time 
due to various reasons, e.g. political condition, product knowledge dissemination, 
perception on religious compliance, and other factors requiring further analysis. The 
same trend is observed for output-orientated VRS and CRS social efficiency in 
Islamic meta-frontier. Thus, this study cannot confirm Abdelkader et al. (2012) who 
asserted that young MFIs have higher efficiency in MENA region, whilst it partly 
support Hermes & Lensink (2011) in Islamic meta-frontier that financial 
sustainability is attained by mature MFIs, yet only when strategy that can be 
undertaken to boost efficiency is by minimising inputs.  
8) a) We found that not-for-profit MFIs generally have significant higher social efficiency 
for both models in all meta-frontiers analysed as per expectation. Not-for-profit MFIs 
also exhibit higher overall efficiency in all meta-frontiers except for SA meta-
frontiers.  
b) Although for-profit MFIs display significant higher financial efficiency in SA meta-
frontiers, yet the effect size is negligible at 0.10 – 0.15. Moreover, in most other 
frontiers excluding global meta-frontiers and VRS output-orientated model in EAP 
meta-frontier, not-for-profit MFIs prevails herein with small and medium effect size 
thereby defying presumption. 
c) Thus, in general we concur with studies suggesting not-for-profit MFIs as the best 
provider of microfinance, e.g. Dichter (1996), Haq et al. (2010), and Ahmed (2002), 
whilst cannot confirm Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010) that for-profit MFIs outperform 
not-for-profit MFIs in social efficiency. 
9) a) We observed that MFI loan scale portfolio has significant impact to almost all overall, 
financial and social efficiency in all meta-frontiers, although not all can show 
significant linear direction trends. Nevertheless, where they do, MFIs that have 
smaller loan portfolio exhibit higher social efficiency and MFIs with larger loan 
portfolio display higher financial efficiency as per presumption. Exception for these 
is in EAP meta-frontier in input-orientated whereby smaller portfolio MFIs exhibit 
higher VRS financial efficiency albeit with small effect size.  
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
34 
 
b) Regarding overall efficiency, trend observed are mixed: MFIs having larger loan 
portfolio prevails in global and SA meta-frontiers, whilst overall efficiency score 
show higher trend in MFIs with smaller loan portfolio in EAP meta-frontier. 
Interestingly, in SA and Islamic meta-frontiers MFIs with smaller loan and larger 
loan portfolio display comparable social efficiency performance.  
c) Thus, we can argue that due to scaling-up, MFIs in global, MENA and SA meta-
frontiers tend to lean more toward financial sustainability. However, we concur with 
Armendariz & Szafarz (2011) that it may be too early to judge an existence of mission 
drift only from total loan portfolio, since a large loan portfolio may consists of many 
small loans, this fact worth further investigation. Moreover, we hereby cannot argue 
that MFIs with smaller loan portfolio tend to have higher social efficiency, since in 
several meta-frontiers MFIs with smaller loan portfolio have comparable social 
efficiency with those with larger loan portfolio.  
10) a) MFI customer targeting significantly affect overall, financial and social efficiency in 
almost all frontiers in all models except for financial efficiency in global and Islamic 
meta-frontiers. Although not all can be established, we observed similar linear trend 
in most relationship where MFIs targeting poorer borrowers to have higher overall 
and social efficiency in all meta-frontiers, with exceptionally large effect size for 
social efficiency in all but Islamic meta-frontiers.  
b) Regarding financial efficiency, comparable performance between MFIs targeting 
different customer are found in most meta-frontiers. Yet, interestingly, we found that 
MFIs targeting poorer borrowers also exhibits higher financial efficiency in SA meta-
frontier (all models) and also in global and EAP meta-frontiers (all model CRS), 
though all with small effect size. Results in the latter two frontiers show that if MFIs 
are operating in their optimal scale size, MFIs focusing poorer borrower will excel in 
financial efficiency.  
c) These results demonstrate that firstly, targeting better-off customers with larger loan 
amount do not necessarily result in higher financial and overall efficiency. Secondly, 
MFIs focusing on the poorer borrower can also demonstrate comparable financial 
efficiency with MFIs targeting well-off borrower. We thereby argue that MFIs can 
have more impact by focusing on the poorest of the poor. We also confirm Copestake 
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(2007b) that MFIs in dataset that deliberately target well-off poor tend to have lower 
outreach.  
11) a) We observed that unregulated MFIs have higher overall, financial and social 
efficiency in all but social efficiency in SA meta-frontiers. We thereby confirm Haq et 
al. (2010) and Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009), who suggested that unregulated MFIs to 
be the best provider for microfinance, and Hartarska and Nadolnyak (2007), who 
stated that MFI transformation may not necessarily lead to better outreach and 
sustainability. Likewise, these cannot concur with Lafourcade et al. (2005), that 
regulated MFIs to have higher efficiency, and Tchakoute-Tchuigoua (2010), that 
regulated for-profit MFIs have better social efficiency than unregulated MFIs.  
b) Secondly, the policy implication of these results is to recommend relevant authorities 
to formulate special regulatory framework for MFI as it has distinct features than 
traditional banking system so as not to overly restrict MFIs flexibility and ability to 
increase its efficiency in its operation. 
9. Conclusion and Direction for Future Research 
Apart from EAP meta-frontier, Islamic/windows MFIs in the dataset deliver comparable 
performance with conventional MFIs in terms of pure overall, financial and social efficiency 
for input-orientated model in global and MENA meta-frontiers, pure social efficiency for 
both models in SA meta-frontier, and also overall efficiency for output-orientated in global 
meta-frontier. Islamic/window MFIs even outperform conventional MFIs in social efficiency 
for both models in SA meta-frontier. This is great news for Islamic/windows MFIs 
proponents, giving empirical evidence that investment of time, efforts and funds onto 
formulising and operating stricter microfinance scheme results in generally equivalent 
performance to conventional MFIs.  
However, conventional MFIs surpassed Islamic/window MFIs in financial and social 
efficiency under output-orientated strategy in global, EAP and SA meta-frontiers, in pure 
overall efficiency in MENA meta-frontiers, and in financial efficiency under input-orientated 
in SA meta-frontier. These findings should serve as warning to IMFIs and their proponents 
considering that, firstly, microfinance providers will naturally strive for output-orientated 
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strategy in order to maximise outputs, i.e. dual objectives, with the constraint of limited 
input resources; thus findings that show conventional MFIs still outshone them in these 
strategy should motivate Islamic/window MFIs to improve their performance in regard to 
this strategy. Secondly, most of Islamic/windows MFIs are currently located in MENA 
region so relatively inferior performance in this region should drive them to perform better 
in the future. Thirdly, even where IMFIs show comparable performance in overall efficiency 
in global meta-frontier for both models and in financial efficiency in global and MENA 
meta-frontiers under input-orientated, conventional MFIs outperform them in CRS 
efficiency due to relative scale efficiency superiority; IMFIs thereby should do hard work to 
improve their operation to go closer to the optimal production scale size.  
In summary, further detail regional or within-country research is needed to assess Islamic/ 
windows MFIs in the future, given limited number of IMFIs in this research. This study 
thereby serves to provide preliminary efficiency assessment in global IMFI performance 
against its conventional counterparts; which is still lacking in literature. Various reasons 
may underlie these results that warrant further analysis in the future, e.g. larger balanced 
dataset needed, in situ erosion in scheme implementation (agency problem) or different 
customer targeting (entrepreneurial poor versus absolute poor). This study also found 
several factors that influence MFIs efficiency that need attention for policy recommendation. 
Further study expects to refine DEA specification and modelling, complemented by 
qualitative field research.  
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Kruskal-
Wallis 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r 
(if significant)
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r  (if 
J significant)
Overall Efficiency 0.113 10706.500 -0.337 0.413 33971.500 0.575
Financial Efficiency 0.004 10955.500 -0.066 15.549* 39055.500* 3.924 0.183
Social Efficiency 0.288 11510.500 0.537 66.278* 22143.500* -7.226 -0.336
Overall Efficiency 0.266 23401.000 0.516 12.572* 20037.500* -3.546 -0.165
Financial Efficiency 0.004 22637.500 -0.062 0.868 23648.000 -0.932
Social Efficiency 1.907 20893.000*** -1.381 -0.064 26.543* 17798.500* -5.152 -0.240
Overall Efficiency 24.131* 35974.500*** 1.405 0.065 31.014* 17386.000* -4.980 -0.232
Financial Efficiency 28.547* 39086.000* 3.430 0.160 6.409*** 23326.000 -0.553
Social Efficiency 22.671* 30126.000* -2.416 -0.112 118.403* 9510.000* -10.821 -0.503
Overall Efficiency 9.646* 20306.000* -3.106 -0.144
Financial Efficiency 7.428* 20817.000* -2.726 -0.127
Social Efficiency 6.509** 21058.000* -2.551 -0.119
* = significant at 99% confidence interval, ** = significant at 95% confidence interval, *** = significant at 90% confidence interval, 
and **** = significant at 85% confidence interval
versus MFI Age versus MFI Profit Orientation
versus MFI Loan Portfolio versus MFI Target Market
versus MFI Legal Regulation
Appendix 1
Summary Post DEA Analysis: Global Meta-frontier Input-orientated VRS
Input-Oriented All 
MFIs
Jonckheere-Terpstra Jonckheere-Terpstra 
versus MFI Scheme versus Region of Operation
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Kruskal-
Wallis 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r 
(if significant)
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r  (if 
J significant)
Overall Efficiency 2.244**** 12396.500*** 1.498 0.070 0.262 32385.000 -0.473
Financial Efficiency 7.483* 13538.000* 2.735 0.127 8.242** 37030.000* 2.588 0.120
Social Efficiency 6.873* 13433.000* 2.622 0.122 95.306* 19193.500* -9.164 -0.426
Overall Efficiency 0.165 23258.000 0.407 9.982* 20559.500* -3.159 -0.147
Financial Efficiency 0.109 23158.000 0.331 0.087 25348.500 0.294
Social Efficiency 0.042 22991.500 0.205 25.261* 17968.000* -5.026 -0.234
Overall Efficiency 7.763** 35408.500**** 1.031 0.048 41.591* 15328.500* -6.495 -0.302
Financial Efficiency 24.638* 41352.000* 4.907 0.228 3.195 22082.000* -1.476 -0.069
Social Efficiency 13.466* 32722.000 -0.721 195.771* 4970.500* -14.184 -0.660
Overall Efficiency 12.380* 19726.000* -3.519 -0.164
Financial Efficiency 8.593* 20532.000* -2.931 -0.136
Social Efficiency 7.397* 20823.500* -2.720 -0.127
* = significant at 99% confidence interval, ** = significant at 95% confidence interval, *** = significant at 90% confidence interval, 
and **** = significant at 85% confidence interval
Appendix 2
Summary Post DEA Analysis: Global Meta-frontier CRS
All MFIs CRS
Jonckheere-Terpstra Jonckheere-Terpstra 
versus MFI Scheme versus Region of Operation
versus MFI Age versus MFI Profit Orientation
versus MFI Loan Portfolio versus MFI Target Market
versus MFI Legal Regulation
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Inputs Initial Definition Usage in literatures Unit
Assets A Total wealth available to MFI from capital 
and borrowings for its transformation 
process. It is used as inputs to represent 
capital for production approach.
Bassem (2008), Kipesha (2012) and 
Gutierrez-Nieto et al. (2009)
USD '000
Operating 
Expense
O Expenses related to operations, e.g. all 
personnel expense, depreciation and 
amortization, and administrative expense. It 
is used as input in production approach since 
production process will not be viable in the 
long run if outputs were produced at high 
costs hence need to be managed to avoid 
waste.
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2007), 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009), 
Hassan and Sanchez (2009) and 
Athanassopoulos (1997)
USD '000
Portfolio at 
Rixk 30 days
R Percentage of total loan outstanding at risk 
of default by having one or more  principal 
or instalments in arrears more than 30 days. 
This variable is used herein as input in 
production approach to represent risk in 
transformation process as less risk is 
favourable for the firm. 
As far as we concerned, it has not 
been used as input in other DEA – 
microfinance literatures. 
%
Employee E Labour input, i.e. all individuals employed by 
MFI, including contract employees or 
advisor whether or not listed on MFI 
employee roster 
Athanassopoulos (1997), Bassem 
(2008), Hassan and Sanchez (2009), 
Sedzro and Keita (2009), Kipesha 
(2012), and Haq et al. (2010)
Numeric
Table 1
M
AN
US
CR
IP
T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Outputs Initial Definition Usage in literatures Unit
MFI 
Objective 
(Efficiency) 
Represented
Financial 
Revenue
F Revenue from loan portfolio, including 
margin rate charged in Islamic microfinance 
loan. It is used as output in production 
approach and proxy for sustainability  since an 
MFI that cannot collect enough revenue will 
not be viable to operate in the long run by 
itself
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) and 
Hassan & Sanchez (2009).
USD '000 Sustainability                 
(Financial 
Efficiency)
Inverse of 
Average 
Loan 
Borrower
I Inverse format of average loan balance per 
MFI borrowers, which is a widely used proxy 
to measure depth of outreach ; standardized over 
gross national income (GNI) per capita to 
remove currency & purchasing power parity 
difference. Usage of inverse format so as to 
have characteristic as output wherre larger 
value means better.
Modification from literatures. 
Gutiérrez-Nieto et al. (2009) use 
average loan borrower as index with 
number of borrower whilst we use 
them separately.
% Outreach                        
(Social 
Efficiency)
Borrowers B the number of individual or entity who 
currently has outstanding loan balance with 
MFIs or is primarily responsible for repaying 
any portion of the Gross Loan Portfolio. 
Herein, it is used an output to resemble the 
breadth of outreach .  
Modification from literatures. Most 
literatures use number of women 
borrowers, e.g. Cull et al. (2007) and 
Nghiem et al. (2006). 
Numeric Sustainability                 
(Financial 
Efficiency)
Table 2
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 DEA 
specifications
Efficiency 
represented 
Inputs variables Outputs variables
•   Assets (A) •   Financial revenue (F)
•   Operating expenses (O)
•   Portfolio at risk 30 days (R)
•   Employees (E) •   Number of borrowers (B)
•   Assets (A) •   Financial revenue (F)
•   Operating Expenses (O)
•   Portfolio at risk 30 days (R)
•   Employees (E)
•   Assets (A)
•   Operating expenses (O)
•   Portfolio at risk 30 days (R) •   Number of borrowers (B)
•   Employees (E)
   •   Average loan balance per Borrower over 
GNI per capita (in Inverse form) – (I)
AORE-FIB
Overall 
efficiency
   •   Average loan balance per Borrower over 
GNI per capita (in Inverse form) – (I)
AORE-F
Financial 
efficiency
AORE-IB
Social 
efficiency
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Convent
ional Islamic
Islamic 
Window
Young 
MFIs
Mature 
MFIs
Not-For-
Profit 
MFI
For-
Profit 
MFI
Small 
Scale 
MFI
Medium 
Scale 
MFI
Large 
Scale 
MFI
Low End Broad High End Small Business Unregulated Regulated 
East Asia 
and the 
Pacific
63 1 0 10 53 28 35 13 26 24 32 28 1 2 25 38
Middle East 
and North 
Africa
29 9 13 22 29 48 3 13 17 21 32 18 0 1 27 24
South Asia 113 4 0 39 78 69 48 25 37 55 97 18 2 0 31 86
MFI Classification
Scheme Age Profit Orientation Loan Portfolio Scale Target Market MFI Transformation
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Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation Minimum Maximum Mean Std. Deviation
A 20775 1411363085 39725199.2078 132154162.4625 117332 1698487761 47480227.2294 159036081.9536
O 11717.10 91315191.60 3867480.9178 10295276.6805 35586.80 106325333.84 4683578.7940 11800895.1393
R 0.0000 0.4879 0.0547 0.0794 0.0000 0.5231 0.0545 0.0874
E 9 24021 815.3463 2643.1310 11 22458 907.1429 2723.5451
F 907.87 229911046.55 7850078.2830 23745427.6498 6206.86 269380158.89 9625851.3015 27796662.5509
I 0.3498 53.7634 7.5863 6.0813 0.1912 58.1395 8.1454 6.7017
B 84 6430000 162123.7532 665144.3807 81 6610000 179743.0087 679588.5097
2009 2010
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Table 6 
A O R E F I B
1.000
.898* .019 .841* 1.000 -.046 .812*
.000 .682 .000 .319 .000
.898* 1.000 .053 .846** -.046 1.000 .266*
.000 .257 .000 .319 .000
.019 .053 1.000 .053
.812* .266* 1.000
.682 .257 .258 .000 .000
.841** .846** .053 1.000
.000 .000 .258
* = Correlation is significant at the 99% confidence interval (2-
tailed).
A
O
R
E
Spearman's Rho Correlations - Within Inputs Spearman's Rho Correlations - Within Outputs
F
I
B
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Islamic & Conventional Global Meta Frontier Output-orientated VRS Only
Overall Efficiency 
VRS 09 (AORE-
FIB)
Financial 
Efficiency VRS 
09 (AORE-F)
Social Efficiency 
VRS 09 (AORE-
IB)
Overall Efficiency 
VRS 10 (AORE-
FIB)
Financial Efficiency 
VRS 10 (AORE-F)
Social Efficiency 
VRS 10 (AORE-IB)
Total 27 27 27 27 27 27
75.32 65.11 44.71 82.48 73.47 48.04
4.41 5.19 6.09 3.91 5.38 6.09
84.63 68.60 40.25 87.68 76.94 45.16
22.91 26.99 31.62 20.31 27.95 31.62
-0.545 -0.460 .669 -0.787 -0.755 .427
.448 .448 .448 .448 .448 .448
24.55 11.56 2.42 38.87 8.46 3.52
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
25 51.41 50.12 21.00 67.84 56.98 15.76
50 84.63 68.60 40.25 87.68 76.94 45.16
75 96.99 91.02 65.76 100.00 100.00 66.29
5 4 3 12 9 4
18.50 14.80 11.10 44.40 33.30 14.80
4 6 18 2 5 15
14.80 22.20 66.70 7.40 18.50 55.60
Overall Efficiency 
VRS 09 (AORE-
FIB)
Financial 
Efficiency VRS 
09 (AORE-F)
Social Efficiency 
VRS 09 (AORE-
IB)
Overall Efficiency 
VRS 10 (AORE-
FIB)
Financial Efficiency 
VRS 10 (AORE-F)
Social Efficiency 
VRS 10 (AORE-IB)
Total 204 204 204 204 204 204
78.24 71.28 54.37 79.31 72.94 57.03
1.23 1.30 2.08 1.22 1.29 2.17
76.95 70.24 53.89 78.84 73.00 58.88
17.58 18.53 29.72 17.45 18.45 31.04
-0.362 .077 .067 -0.346 -0.096 -.003
.170 .170 .170 .170 .170 .170
26.53 26.53 3.16 29.47 28.88 3.00
100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
25 65.58 56.85 30.20 66.80 58.79 28.78
50 76.95 70.24 53.89 78.84 73.00 58.88
75 97.45 86.92 75.17 100.00 88.58 85.85
44 28 28 55 31 40
21.60 13.70 13.70 27.00 15.20 19.60
10 23 93 11 22 90
4.90 11.30 45.60 5.40 10.80 44.10
Maximum
Percentiles
Fully Efficient DMU
% of Fully Efficient DMU
DMU with score <50.00
% of DMU with score <50.00
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Std. Deviation
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Minimum
Conventional MFIs
2009 Frontier 2010 Frontier
Mean
% of DMU with score <50.00
DMU with score <50.00
% of Fully Efficient DMU
Islamic/W indows MFIs
2009 Frontier 2010 Frontier
Mean
Std. Error of Mean
Median
Fully Efficient DMU
Std. Deviation
Skewness
Std. Error of Skewness
Minimum
Maximum
Percentiles
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Kruskal-
Wallis 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r  (if 
J significant)
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r  (if 
J significant)
Overall Efficiency 0.598 11726.500 0.773 0.077 33457.500 0.235
Financial Efficiency 1.588 12177.500**** 1.260 0.059 12.016* 38232.000* 3.381 0.157
Social Efficiency 7.297* 13504.500* 2.701 0.126 78.319* 21067.500* -7.935 -0.369
Overall Efficiency 0.973 24022.000 0.987 10.213* 20521.500* -3.196 -0.149
Financial Efficiency 0.691 23820.500 0.832 0.003 24868.000 -0.052
Social Efficiency 0.125 23187.000 0.353 26.350* 17824.500* -5.133 -0.239
Overall Efficiency 27.514* 37583.000* 2.457 0.114 36.033* 16719.500* -5.477 -0.255
Financial Efficiency 43.336* 42684.00* 5.778 0.269 4.887 23686.500 -0.285
Social Efficiency 16.363* 33405.500 -0.275 210.066* 4265.000* -14.719 -0.685
versus MFI Age versus MFI Profit Orientation
versus MFI Loan Portfolio versus MFI Target Market
Table 8
Summary Post DEA Analysis: Global Meta-frontier Output-orientated VRS
Output-Oriented All 
MFIs 
Jonckheere-Terpstra Jonckheere-Terpstra 
versus MFI Scheme versus Region of Operation
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Overall Efficiency 10.009* 20226.500* -3.164 -0.147
Financial Efficiency 4.834** 21542.000** -2.199 -0.102
Social Efficiency 9.671* 20289.500* -3.110 -0.145
* = significant at 99% confidence interval, ** = significant at 95% confidence interval, *** = significant at 90% confidence interval, 
and **** = significant at 85% confidence interval
 
versus MFI Regulation
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Kruskal-
Wallis 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r  (if 
J significant)
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r  (if 
J significant)
Overall Efficiency 0.113 10706.500 -0.337 0.413 33971.500 0.575
Financial Efficiency 0.004 10955.500 -0.066 15.549* 39055.500* 3.924 0.183
Social Efficiency 0.288 11510.500 0.537 66.278* 22143.500* -7.226 -0.336
Overall Efficiency 0.266 23401.000 0.516 12.572* 20037.500* -3.546 -0.165
Financial Efficiency 0.004 22637.500 -0.062 0.868 23648.000 -0.932
Social Efficiency 1.907 20893.000*** -1.381 -0.064 26.543* 17798.500* -5.152 -0.240
Overall Efficiency 24.131* 35974.500*** 1.405 0.065 31.014* 17386.000* -4.980 -0.232
versus MFI Age versus MFI Profit Orientation
versus MFI Loan Portfolio versus MFI Target Market
Appendix 1
Summary Post DEA Analysis: Global Meta-frontier Input-orientated VRS
Input-Oriented All 
MFIs
Jonckheere-Terpstra Jonckheere-Terpstra 
versus MFI Scheme versus Region of Operation
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Financial Efficiency 28.547* 39086.000* 3.430 0.160 6.409*** 23326.000 -0.553
Social Efficiency 22.671* 30126.000* -2.416 -0.112 118.403* 9510.000* -10.821 -0.503
Overall Efficiency 9.646* 20306.000* -3.106 -0.144
Financial Efficiency 7.428* 20817.000* -2.726 -0.127
Social Efficiency 6.509** 21058.000* -2.551 -0.119
* = significant at 99% confidence interval, ** = significant at 95% confidence interval, *** = significant at 90% confidence interval, 
and **** = significant at 85% confidence interval
versus MFI Legal Regulation
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Kruskal-
Wallis 
Kruskal-
Wallis 
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r  (if 
J significant)
H -statistic J -statistic z -score
    Effect size r  (if 
J significant)
Overall Efficiency 2.244**** 12396.500*** 1.498 0.070 0.262 32385.000 -0.473
Financial Efficiency 7.483* 13538.000* 2.735 0.127 8.242** 37030.000* 2.588 0.120
Social Efficiency 6.873* 13433.000* 2.622 0.122 95.306* 19193.500* -9.164 -0.426
Overall Efficiency 0.165 23258.000 0.407 9.982* 20559.500* -3.159 -0.147
Financial Efficiency 0.109 23158.000 0.331 0.087 25348.500 0.294
Social Efficiency 0.042 22991.500 0.205 25.261* 17968.000* -5.026 -0.234
Overall Efficiency 7.763** 35408.500**** 1.031 0.048 41.591* 15328.500* -6.495 -0.302
versus MFI Age versus MFI Profit Orientation
versus MFI Loan Portfolio versus MFI Target Market
Appendix 2
Summary Post DEA Analysis: Global Meta-frontier CRS
All MFIs CRS
Jonckheere-Terpstra Jonckheere-Terpstra 
versus MFI Scheme versus Region of Operation
M
AN
US
CR
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T
 
AC
CE
PT
ED
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
Financial Efficiency 24.638* 41352.000* 4.907 0.228 3.195 22082.000* -1.476 -0.069
Social Efficiency 13.466* 32722.000 -0.721 195.771* 4970.500* -14.184 -0.660
Overall Efficiency 12.380* 19726.000* -3.519 -0.164
Financial Efficiency 8.593* 20532.000* -2.931 -0.136
Social Efficiency 7.397* 20823.500* -2.720 -0.127
* = significant at 99% confidence interval, ** = significant at 95% confidence interval, *** = significant at 90% confidence interval, 
and **** = significant at 85% confidence interval
versus MFI Legal Regulation
